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Oral evidence
Taken before the Education Committee
on Wednesday 15 September 2010
Members present:
Mr Graham Stuart (Chair)
Nic Dakin Ian Mearns
Damian Hinds Tessa Munt
Liz Kendall Lisa Nandy
Charlotte Leslie
Witness: Sharon Shoesmith, Former Director of Children’s Services, London Borough of Haringey, gave
evidence.
Q1 Chair: Good morning, and welcome to this
meeting of the Education Committee on child
safeguarding. I welcome Sharon Shoesmith to our
deliberations and thank her for coming in to give
evidence. I believe that you would like to say a few
words, and I am happy for you to do so.
Sharon Shoesmith: Yes please, Chair, if I may. It will
only be for a couple of minutes—no more than that.
First, I want to thank you for inviting me here this
morning. I really want to start by saying that there
was never any doubt about how sorry I and everyone
else at Haringey was about the murder of Peter
Connelly—absolutely no doubt at all. To construct a
narrative so simple, which told the public that Peter
Connelly died because Haringey was uniquely weak,
and that sacking everyone from the director to the
social workers meant that all would be well, was
frankly absurd. The other story will be told
eventually, but I want to start this morning by saying
to you, Chair, that if you and your Committee
members believe the narrative put to the public by
some elements of the press and some politicians, we
begin on different pages. The impact for children has
been far-reaching. I think we all know that. Since
2008, the number of children coming into care has
increased by 30%—that is 60,000 children up to
80,000 children, or 0.5% up to 0.7% of our 11 million
children in care. The number of children subject to a
child protection plan has doubled—that is 30,000 to
60,000. Yet, sadly, this wider net seems to have had
very little impact on the number of children who die.
In the year that Peter died, sadly 54 other children
also died. When I say that and give these numbers, I
mean that they died at the hands of their parents,
close family members and wider family. In the 10
months into 2009, when we had this much wider net,
56 children died—an increase on the year before.
Social work vacancies are high, fostering cannot
meet demand, and almost a third of Directors of
Children’s Services left in just over a year. Over 30
years, the rate of child murder has remained largely
the same. In the decade 1999 to 2009, 539 children
died in this way. Those are shocking statistics, which
are not known. They are too abhorrent to
contemplate. Hence my saying that that simple
narrative was so absurd. Some would argue that
taking more children away from the parents is the
right approach, and I really think that we need to
explore that thoroughly—is it the better approach?
We would have to say that if half the children who
are now subject to child protection plans—that’s
300,000—were to be taken from their parents, it
would cost the country an extra £1.5 billion.
Whatever the answer, the whole sector is now, in my
view, motivated by a fear of failure and not the
conditions for success. Clearly, there is much to do
and the issues that stand clear in my mind are around
five areas: public accountability, inspection and
development, multi-agency or inter-agency work,
levels of risk, and professional representation. Chair,
in closing, I would like to say that I am as committed
as I ever was in the years that I have worked for
children to the care and protection of those children,
and I am here to help you and your Committee as
best I can. Thank you.
Q2 Chair: Thank you very much for that. You talked
about some of the short-term effects. Can you tell us
what you think the long-term effect of the Peter
Connelly case may be and why you described the
Minister’s response to the case as “reckless”?
Sharon Shoesmith: There are two levels there. On the
long-term impact, I went to Haringey as Director of
Education and saw the aftermath of the death of
Victoria Climbie´ and the huge struggle to put things
right. I inherited a service that had a large of number
of children in its teams—these were the children who
had come into care after the same reaction back then
to Victoria’s death. One of the pressures I had in my
time in Haringey was to try to bring those numbers
back down to match similar authorities. That was
the pressure I was under. That was the direction of
travel—to bring the number down.
Q3 Chair: Do you think that was right? As a result
of the Peter Connelly case, hundreds of millions of
pounds extra a year have been spent by local
authorities on bringing more children into care, as
you set out in your opening remarks. A central
question for this Committee is whether we now have
a more appropriate intervention regime, or whether
there has been an overreaction. Perhaps it is too
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early to say in terms of the number of children who
die at the hands of their families but, as you say, the
evidence so far is not of a material change for the
better.
Sharon Shoesmith: Social care for children requires a
very delicate balance of a number of factors. One is
the confidence of social workers. One of my biggest
issues after the news of Peter’s murder on 3 August
2007 was to hold the service steady, not to see the
same impact on that service that we have seen
nationwide. In that period of time, we managed to
stabilise the service, to hold the confidence and go
forward. That was a very difficult process. We had
begun to move forward again. Then—this is why I
referred to the Minister as “reckless”; I think you are
referring to my interview in The Guardian in
February 2009—I watched the broadcast on 1
December as I was waiting to hear when I would get
a copy of the report, and I was shocked and horrified
that anyone did not realise the impact that that was
going to have across the whole social work sector,
the whole social care sector. It was obvious to me and
to everyone else at that moment that that whole
sector would virtually collapse, and that is what we
have seen. It will be a long haul to bring it back. A
lot of things that have been done are good, such as
the Social Work Taskforce and the Munro
Commission that you have set up. I never ever want
to use the dreadful phrase, “Peter Connelly’s death
was not in vain.” That would be a dreadful way in
which to reflect on anyone’s death. What is sad for
me is that many of the things that we knew to be
wrong in the sector weren’t heard until we had such
a tragedy.
Q4 Chair: The second Serious Case Review into
Peter’s death concluded that the ethos that informed
the professionals’ interactions with his family were
inadequate and that expectations were too low and
interventions insufficiently authoritative. Why was
that so, and do you believe that the culture/ethos of
safeguarding, not only in Haringey but elsewhere,
has changed for the better since?
Sharon Shoesmith: I think one of the lasting issues of
this case surrounds why all those professionals—
police, doctors, consultants, nurses, health visitors
and social workers—were caught in the trap of
feeling that the mother was being genuine. Why did
they not question that more? I think that has to be
the overriding question, and therein lie research
opportunities and lessons to learn. I was in the room
when the police officer came in and said that the
mother had been charged with murder. Remember
that no one was ever sentenced for murder, but I was
in the room when that happened and those who
knew Peter Connelly and the mother were
completely taken aback and said, “That couldn’t
possibly be the case. You must have it wrong: this
couldn’t be the case.” That was their reaction,
having known this person. I, of course, didn’t know
her or Peter Connelly.
Q5 Charlotte Leslie: Thank you very much for
coming along. My questions revolve around
responsibility. I am a layman without great expertise
in this issue, but issues of responsibility strike me as
important, both in terms of who takes ultimate
responsibility for an individual child as they move
through the social care system, and of who takes
responsibility at every level up to the top. What did
you feel responsibility meant in your role as Director
of Children’s Services, and what was your role of
responsibility in the case?
Sharon Shoesmith: I was responsible as a DCS for
approximately 1,300 staff, including about 500
social care staff. I was responsible for the operation
of that service, both in education and social care.
Q6 Charlotte Leslie: In terms of your general
responsibility for the entire department over which
you presided, for which you were paid as Director of
Children’s Services, what did the concept of
responsibility mean to you?
Sharon Shoesmith: I was there to make sure that
the quality and provision of education was there
in Haringey. Indeed, the massive improvements
that we made in education are well known.
I was also there to provide good quality children’s
social care, which included the protection of
children. Once this dreadful news came, I was
responsible for understanding what went wrong—
and understanding it in some detail. That was why I
was present at the first Serious Case Review—to
understand fully what went wrong, particularly in
relation to my own staff, the social workers. What I
can’t be responsible for—I think this is quite a big
issue for your Committee—is the conduct and
operation of other services. I can’t be responsible for
health and I can’t be responsible for police, although
it has been suggested that a DCS should be
responsible for those services. I wasn’t.
Q7 Charlotte Leslie: One thing that I think is
interesting is to look at the future of social care, at
where we go from here. One of the issues that we are
looking at is the parity of professionalism between
social care and, say, medicine. It strikes me that, in
medical circles, someone who is at the top of the
pile and at the top of the pay scale—getting paid
a considerable amount for responsibility—is
obviously not responsible for every single individual
over whom they preside, but they are ultimately
responsible if something goes wrong under them.
They are paid for that responsibility. If something
goes wrong, they tend to step down as a mark of
taking responsibility. I wonder if you feel that that is
something that analogously should apply to the
social services sector. Perhaps this failure to take
responsibility for something that happens is one of
the things that prevents social services from being
seen in the same professional light as medicine.
Sharon Shoesmith: Yes. I don’t know the detail of the
cases in the health field that you refer to, but I know
generally that that kind of decision—
Charlotte Leslie: If something goes wrong on
someone’s watch, they step down. They say, “I was
the one who was responsible for this. I will step down
because it happened on my watch.” That is one of
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the very important things about the accountability
and professionalism of health care and medicine,
which is why they have such great respect.
Sharon Shoesmith: My responsibility, as I
understood it then, was to understand what had
happened, for the social workers to go through the
council’s procedures and to look carefully at what
their conduct had been. I said this on television at the
time, and in fact it was the only thing that the press
wanted to run: what came out of that was that there
was not the evidence to sack those social workers.
The issue of where you pin responsibility is to do
with the complexity of services working together—
we have health, police and social workers working
together. Quite honestly, if a child has died and you
decide that the automatic route, no matter what the
conduct has been, is that the Director of Children’s
Services steps down or resigns, you’ll lose all
Directors of Children’s Services across the country;
there’ll be more than a 50% annual turnover. But I
have not, at any point when I have spoken about this
case, attributed blame. That is not the culture that
I’m in. But I have to ask, in response to your
question: where were the resignations in health, if
you tell me that this is why the sector is held in such
high esteem? Where were the resignations there, if we
had a consultant and a GP who made some very
serious mistakes? I would have to discuss this in
much more depth with you to really—
Charlotte Leslie: I would respond by saying that the
Department of Children’s Services is the department
that is commissioned to look after the welfare of that
child overall. That is why it was formed. I would
expect, therefore, the responsibility to lie with the
Department of Children’s Services, as it is named.
Sharon Shoesmith: Could I comment on that? I think
that you raise a very important point. Again, I
preface my comments by saying that it has never
been my approach to criticise and blame anyone else.
So, you’re telling me, given that Peter was presented
to health settings on 34 occasions, and when he
turned up to his appointment with the consultant,
that that consultant had not a single record of any of
those presentations—only the letter from the social
worker—that I should take responsibility for a
complete breakdown of systems in health? I would
say no.
Q8 Charlotte Leslie: Moving on to Ofsted, when the
initial Ofsted report came out on the performance of
Haringey, what did you think of it? Did you think
that it was an accurate or an inaccurate reflection of
what was going on?
Sharon Shoesmith: It is very difficult to answer that
in a few minutes. I have written down all my
recollections of these things.
Q9 Charlotte Leslie: But broadly, did you think,
“Yes, that’s pretty much what I expected,” or, “Oh,
I’m not sure about that”?
Sharon Shoesmith: The inspection report did not
reflect the inspection itself or my experience of the
inspection—what was said to me in the inspection.
One of the inspectors later in the court case was very
clear that they had not found any cases that made
them feel that they needed to react in an urgent way.
That was the wording in his statement. The written
report didn’t reflect what I had experienced at all. I
was sitting, on 1 December, waiting to read the
report when I learned of my demise on live
television. That was why I was there, because the
experience didn’t match the report. Indeed, the
comments made about leadership on that occasion
were made up. They don’t actually appear in the
inspection report, or in the inspection evidence. I
now have reams of material on the inspection
evidence, and some of the statements that were made
are not in the inspection report, nor did they appear
in the record of evidence. They are not there.
Q10 Liz Kendall: Thank you for coming today. As
Director of Children’s Services, you said that you
could not have been held responsible for what
happened with the NHS staff and the police, but you
were responsible for your department and your staff.
Do you think you or your department made any
mistakes in handling the case of Peter Connelly?
Sharon Shoesmith: Yes, undoubtedly.
Q11 Liz Kendall: What were those mistakes?
Sharon Shoesmith: There were errors of judgment—
professional errors of judgment. It is a very difficult
issue for everyone in the professional world who
works in these sorts of services, and indeed for your
Committee in considering these matters.
Q12 Liz Kendall: What was your error of judgment?
You said there were professional errors of judgment.
Sharon Shoesmith: I didn’t have any personal
dealing with the case at all.
Q13 Liz Kendall: Should you have had?
Sharon Shoesmith: No. Haringey had 55,000
children—0 to 19-year-olds. We had about 1,000
children—about 6001 of those in care. We had
several hundred asylum-seeking children—you’ve
seen “Newsnight”—and we had about 250 children
who were subject to a child protection plan. So I
wouldn’t have known the case, and that would be
expected. If you ask any DCS, they will confirm
that position.
Q14 Liz Kendall: Coming back to the question, do
you feel you made any mistakes in the case of what
happened with Baby P?
Sharon Shoesmith: The question is very broad.
Q15 Liz Kendall: What would you have done
differently?
Sharon Shoesmith: That’s one heck of a question,
given what I have experienced. I have dealt with
death threats and so on, and brought myself back
from the brink.
Q16 Liz Kendall: But I’m sure you’ve learnt from the
case. What have you learnt and what would you do
differently?
1 Witness correction: Haringey had about 400 children in care
in November 2008 and this figure included asylum seeking
children, many unaccompanied.
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Sharon Shoesmith: I go back to 3 August 2007 when
I heard the news of Peter’s death. The cynical view
would have been to jump then. I didn’t, because I
was always very deeply committed to Haringey, and
I still am. I wish them well as they go forward. I
worked very hard for the borough. I could have
gone, and sometimes I think, why didn’t I? But I
don’t really get into the realms of regret in all walks
of life. I stayed. I did what I did.
Q17 Liz Kendall: Having looked back at the case,
there’s nothing that you would have done differently
as Director of Children’s Services?
Sharon Shoesmith: I had no contact with the case
at all.
Q18 Liz Kendall: There’s nothing about the way the
department was structured or the way the staff were
supported that you think should have changed, if
you’d gone back in time? It was your responsibility.
Sharon Shoesmith: The issues that social care staff
were managing were huge—things that were way
beyond the imagination of the public. I had been in
education. When I took over the social workers, one
of the first things that occurred to me—that I could
see—was, why are they in the department so much?
Why are they sitting in front of computers?
Q19 Liz Kendall: Would you have done anything to
change that? Was there anything you could have
done to change that?
Sharon Shoesmith: At that point, that was how the
system worked. We had an IT system that had to be
completed in a certain way. Records and so on were
very important. That’s how the thing operated. A
number of DCSs were looking together at different
ways of supporting social workers to get that
material on to computer systems so that they could
be released to use their professional skills. Work was
going on to do that—we were very much hoping to
see something sensible coming out of ContactPoint
and so on, but I think I heard a cheer go up across
London when you got rid of it. There are massive
issues around the IT systems. Yes, I had expectations
of education staff—that I should not see them in the
office. If they are about schools, then they are in
schools. Many education staff were expected to be in
the department only on a Friday afternoon. To me,
this whole thing about having directors who came
from an education background was a red herring. In
actual fact, we were raising some of these issues—
indeed, our colleagues who had been in social care
for longer were also concerned about these things.
Q20 Ian Mearns: This raises an interesting question
about the role of a Director of Children’s Services.
Many Directors of Children’s Services were former
Directors of Education, and many others were
former Directors of Social Services or of Children’s
Social Services. Certainly, when the role of Director
of Children’s Services was created, to a lot of people
the breadth of the role was very great, and an
enormous responsibility. Has that in itself had any
bearing on the depth of the role that is meant to be
undertaken by Directors of Children’s Services,
given the different areas of expertise that they come
from? Has that had any bearing on how things have
developed in policy terms and on delivery
mechanisms in local authorities?
Sharon Shoesmith: It is a huge role, there is no doubt
about that. The way in which the organisation is
structured, from the director down, is very
important. Whatever background the DCS has
come from, most departments around the country—
in fact, probably all departments—would have a
lead for children’s social care and a lead for
education; people who are professional in those
areas. You have to ask the question, how do those
people then progress to being a DCS? I know that is
being tackled through the NCSL programme, which
I think is very good indeed, but I don’t think that
therein lie all the answers. I really don’t. For me the
answers lie in how we support inter-agency working
on the ground—for me, that’s where it is. When you
look at the cuts coming down the line, the tragedy
will be that these different departments begin to sort
out the cuts that they have to put in place as separate
entities—they won’t actually work together, as a
whole body and as a team around the child, in an
area to support and protect children. The approach
has to be multi-agency. That is where the real
answers lie. Add to that some of the bigger
discussions around having 0.7% of children in care.
If we have 2% in care, have we failed or succeeded?
If we have 10% in care, we have definitely failed,
have we not? That would say something very serious
about family life in Britain. Where is the point that
we feel is right? How do we compare with other
countries? We need to look at adoption. We know
that a large proportion of adoptions break down if
children are adopted over the age of two. Even if
they don’t break down in a formal sense, we know
that adopted young people grow into adults who
search for their birth family. We have also seen tragic
cases where we have had children adopted
erroneously—we have made mistakes. There was a
case in Norfolk, I think, where that happened. Yet it
is too late, because the law is in place. Is there
another way of supporting children, which is not a
permanent adoption and keeps them in touch with
their birth families? We need a serious, in-depth
debate, possibly to run alongside the Munro review,
which I think is very good, although I would like to
see it focus a little more on inter-agency work.
Possibly Eileen Munro will do that—possibly it is
already happening. From what I can read, from
what is available to me, those are the things that we
need to take forward. I would also like to ask, if I
may, whether the death of children and the
protection of children have to be party political
issues. Can we have an all-party approach that asks
what happens to these children who are murdered?
How do Serious Case Reviews work? Can we look
at them all across the country, and can we ever get a
handle on the statistic to draw it down? Those are
some of the big questions that I feel persist.
Q21 Nic Dakin: Thank you for coming, Sharon. We
are cross-party here, looking at this issue in a very
cross-party way, and we’re very focused on the
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welfare of children. Thank you very much for
coming today. You mentioned inspection as one of
your five areas that are important for getting this
right. What do you consider to be the hallmarks of
a safeguarding inspection regime that would be
effective, accurate, fair and command confidence?
Sharon Shoesmith: I wish I could give you a slick
answer. I think Ofsted, like everyone else around the
country, had to work very hard to try to bring two
parts of a service together. I feel that it grafted social
care inspection on to an education model, and I
think that’s where some of the problems have been.
I understand the need to run with the snap
safeguarding inspections, but again I would say:
does that mean, if you get a clean bill of health, that a
child won’t die in your authority, or would we simply
have a different narrative if that happened? So it
can’t ever guarantee that all will be well. I always
liked the thematic inspections that Ofsted did,
looking in depth across the country at a certain area,
and I think that would be very good. You saw
yesterday the report about SEN, which was a piece
of thematic inspection—obviously, there is always
controversy. Thematic inspection can look in depth
at some of these areas, possibly at thresholds or at
how agencies work together, and some learning can
be done. So while we have inspection, it seems to me
that we lost some of the development side that was
with CSCI when the whole responsibility went to
Ofsted. We’ve lost that development side, so where
would I, as a DCS taking in social care, go to have
an in-depth discussion about how this is being
developed and what some of our objectives would
be? Where would I have gone to do that? Nowhere,
except to other colleagues and other forums that
we’ve built ourselves, or through the ADCS. But
development is a very important part—the other
side of inspection. Yes, we need inspection. I would
like to look at the thematic approach. I hear that
Ofsted now talks to social workers. Of course, it
must talk to social workers. In the inspection of
Haringey, no social worker on any case that was
scrutinised was ever spoken to—going back to pick
up your point. I had no concern about it, but of
course it became a concern later when we saw the
impact of that inspection. But the inspectors
explained that they hadn’t the time to do that, and
they realised that they had missed that part out.
They now talk to social workers. But get out there,
on the ground, with social workers, into the homes,
and see what’s happening with the multi-agencies.
Get out there and see it. I think that that’s what
needs to be done.
Q22 Charlotte Leslie: I would like briefly to come
back to inspection. I’m sorry if this has been
answered, but I just want to make it clear for the sake
of the Committee and the meeting. The initial Ofsted
report that was done, the annual performance
assessment in 2007, assessed the council’s services as
“good”. Did you feel at that point that that reflected
those services, or did you have misgivings that
perhaps things were not as well as Ofsted had said?
If you did, did you do anything about it?
Sharon Shoesmith: When the annual performance
assessment happened in 2007, yes, we got the
“good”. I was obviously very pleased with that, as
was the department.
Q23 Charlotte Leslie: Did you feel it reflected
accurately the organisation over which you presided
at that time?
Sharon Shoesmith: At the time, yes, it did, and the
council were very behind children’s social care. They
put as much money as they could into it, albeit they
were a floor authority; remember they had a very
poor financial settlement during that period. So yes,
I was pleased with that, but there is always some
criticism in that. There is an overall “good” but there
were things we needed to work on, which we were
working on, and I always expected my deputy
directors to commission other pieces of work—and
there were other pieces of work commissioned—to
help inform me in greater depth. And that went on.
Q24 Charlotte Leslie: So when after full inspection
the Ofsted assessment was changed from “good” to
“inadequate” were you surprised at its findings? Do
you think there were things that Ofsted picked up,
which changed its assessment from “good” to
“inadequate”, that you had not picked up on—if
you felt that the original assessment of “good” was
a valid assessment for the local authority?
Sharon Shoesmith: The two things you are talking
about are 2007, with the “good”; then they came
back, because it is an annual thing, in 2008. What we
do is put in a self-assessment. We always did it
thoroughly, so they had a self-assessment that was
kind of an inch thick, with lots of evidence and so on.
We took these matters very seriously. They came and
spent a day with us on 20 October 2008 and the news
broke on 11 November 2008. We had a very good
day on 20 October and we were expecting that we
would break through into some areas of outstanding
work; that was around the participation of young
people, in that area—not children’s social care,
because children’s social care was the one that was
taking the hardest work all of the time to keep it
there. We had had a huge wobble in that year of
holding the service steady, and I might have expected
some issues to have been drawn through that, ie
some concerns that they might have had; but overall,
as they left that day, we were expecting an overall
“good”. There was absolutely nothing to indicate
that it wouldn’t be an overall “good”, and Ofsted
knew all about Peter Connelly’s death. It was
informed one working day after he died, in fact. So
we were expecting that.
Q25 Charlotte Leslie: So all the time that things were
going on, you felt things were good—all the time
that the misdemeanours and problems were going on
that caused the tragic death of baby P—you felt the
service was good all the time that was going on.
Sharon Shoesmith: The service during that time,
from Peter’s death, took quite a knock, quite a hit.
Q26 Charlotte Leslie: But your assessment of it was
still that it was good.
Processed: 01-11-2010 20:47:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 005661 Unit: PAG1
Ev 6 Education Committee: Evidence
15 September 2010 Sharon Shoesmith
Sharon Shoesmith: You are wanting me to say that,
and I can’t say that as categorically as you would like
me to.
Q27 Charlotte Leslie: I am just trying to make it clear
for the sake of the Committee.
Sharon Shoesmith: Yes. The service had taken quite
a knock. It was good; we were concerned to try and
hold it there. There were huge issues of confidence
among the social workers. They were deeply
distressed. The department went into turmoil during
that period, before the public knew, and there was a
lot of, really, steadying that service. Now, there are
about seven, eight, nine areas that the APA looks at,
and they were all fine; they would stay good. We
were concerned that the “good” recommendation we
had on children’s social care could go to “adequate”.
If anything, that’s what I would have expected,
because when you look at the detail of what
happened around Peter, there were a number of
errors of judgment—professional errors of
judgment—on behalf of the social workers. They
thought they could keep this little boy in that family,
and they were wrong. It was as simple as that. They
were wrong, sadly; very sadly.
Q28 Chair: Some other local authorities, including
one of the largest, have a systematic record of failure
in child safeguarding, which has been sustained over
quite a period, and would appear, from inspection,
Witnesses: Dr Maggie Atkinson, Children’s Commissioner for England, Professor Frank Furedi, Professor
of Sociology, University of Kent, and Colin Green, Association of Directors of Children’s Services
Spokesperson on Safeguarding, gave evidence.
Q29 Chair: Good morning. Welcome to our
Committee deliberations this morning. We have
with us Professor Frank Furedi, Colin Green and Dr
Maggie Atkinson. If you are comfortable with it, we
will use first names. We are talking about that most
serious of issues, child safeguarding. I know that you
have all heard the evidence given already this
morning. Given that Directors of Children’s
Services do not have powers over all the agencies
that operate for children, is their role an impossible
one? Have they been set up in a sense to fail,
especially when the number of deaths at the hands of
family members has been consistent, although
variable, at around 50 children a year?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: I was one, so if you want I can
start and then pass to someone who still is. You will
know that in my current role I come very largely
from the point of view of what children tell me. We
talk to hundreds of children a year who have
experience of the systems right across the piece from
schools to social care to health, to mental health, to
youth justice and to others. It is, as Sharon
explained, a very complex and broad-ranging job
with a strong sense of a very wide span of control,
even within the council. Children and young people
tell me that they would rather have one door to go
through, no matter which services they are then
referred to if they have a need for additional help and
to be considerably worse than Haringey, and of
course have also had deaths at the hands of
families—some of them quite horrific—after many
notifications. Yet in many of those other cases the
Directors of Children’s Services have not found
themselves in the position that you have found
yourself in—that is being seen as the central figure in
the tale. Do you feel bitter about the way things have
worked out in Haringey, and for you in particular, in
comparison to other areas of the country?
Sharon Shoesmith: Do I feel bitter? Quite early on,
once I had got through the stage of being at risk
myself, and, indeed, having dealt with death threats
and other nasty things that come through letter
boxes, which I’ll not tell the Committee about, I
realised that the No. 1 thing that I had left was my
health; and I decided to look after my health in a
very serious way. So I had a regime of walking, etc.
I won’t go into the detail, but I have decided not to
go in any bitter or twisted direction. I want to try to
stay that way. In fact my earlier comments about
health are as much as I would have said to have
pointed at anything else. I think it is a very complex
story. Of course I look back on it and there are parts
of it where I cannot believe what has happened, but
an awful lot of people need to reflect on their
behaviour in this case. They can do that quietly
themselves. A lot of people need to reflect on how
they have behaved and why we have got here.
Chair: Thank you very much for coming and giving
evidence to us this morning.
additional support and service. Having a Director of
Children’s Services—and don’t forget the political
dimension of a lead member for everything to do
with children in any local authority—is a job that is
worth continuing to press on with, whether or not
there is a legal requirement for a Children’s Trust. I
say that because former Councillor Mearns, who
was deputy leader of Gateshead council when I was
DCS there, will tell you that the structures which
Sharon said that everybody needed under them, with
strong expertise in social care, education, youth
justice and health, within the council or able to be
held to account by the council, are a means of getting
in earlier with children who are in difficulty,
answering their needs once and for all and helping
them through to safeguarding or other services that
they may need. People in a place feel that their
endeavour is about the community in that place.
What Sharon also indicated is that there are still
difficulties in getting all partners—I come back to
some of the other questions—to sit at the same table
and decide together what is best for the children and
young people in an area. That is where the hard work
has to come. The role is difficult and is very big, but
it is worth the candle.
Q30 Chair: Can it be done? They don’t have powers
over health. They don’t have powers over the police.
In a London context, in particular, there are
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typically huge numbers of locum social workers. If
you have somebody, like Sharon Shoesmith, who
had a background in education and becomes the
director, is it likely that they will succeed?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: Many, many do. Cases such as
those of Peter Connelly, Khyra Ishaq, the two boys
in Doncaster and others make the news not only
because they are truly horrific, but because they are
exceptional. There are 11.8 million children and
young people in this country aged 0 to 19. You can
add another million or so to that figure if you include
those who have been in care, because they remain the
responsibility of services for children and young
people until the age of 21. In most cases, and in most
lives, they are kept safe, well, properly educated and
are prepared to be the citizens that they will become.
Most of the children and young people who we meet
at the Children’s Commissioner’s office are rounded
and truly great human beings in the making. That is
in no short measure due to the quality of most
services for children and young people—I am sure
that you, as constituency MPs, have seen great
examples that you could quote—but, none the less,
it is necessary to intervene in those exceptional cases
that we have discussed. Such interventions should be
robust, but should always be made with a view to
improving those services. If you were to read
the latest Ofsted reports on Haringey, you will
discover that, even in a struggling borough, such
improvements are under way.
Q31 Chair: If you read the reports published before
baby Peter’s case, you might have thought that
improvements were being made then, too.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: You would, and, as president
of ADCS, I said so, because that inspection report
was the only evidence that I had to go on. Sharon has
mined deeply into what lay behind those inspection
reports and the evidence files concerned. This
Committee, or its predecessor, has questioned the
inspection and regulation systems, and it has also
questioned the practitioners.
Q32 Chair: Colin, is it an impossible job?
Colin Green: No, I would not be doing it if it were
impossible. It is an exciting job, and in many respects
it is the best job that I have had in my career in
children’s services. In addition to what Maggie has
said, the job, like any large job, is a team effort. The
job is made possible by the team you build around
you in the local authority and in the partner
agencies. The role’s statutory basis, among other
things, gives some leverage with the other partners.
That leverage is not always easy to exercise, but it is
significantly better than what we had before. You
started at the top by talking about the small number
of children who are murdered and might have been
protected, and reducing that number will require the
best quality universal services for all children. In a
sense, the rationale for having a Director of
Children’s Services is the connection between
providing universal services and providing
additional or quite specialist services to those
children who need them. In many ways, the job of a
Director of Children’s Services also covers young
people and taking the lead for families in the local
authority, which makes sense. All of those services
must work together if we are to do better for those
families who have the greatest difficulty. Prior to
being a Director of Children’s Services, my career
was in social services—I was also a civil servant for
a short time—and that hard end of children’s social
care was too often in a little ghetto of its own, where
it was not sufficiently connected with all of the other
services for children. That meant that the needs of
those children, particularly looked-after children,
were not well served, because, as they were with
children’s social care or social services, other people
said, “They are being looked after,” so such children
became less of a priority for education or parts of the
NHS. The rationale for the role remains as
absolutely forceful as it was in 2003–04, when the
role was developed. The job can be done, but only
with a good team and political support.
Q33 Chair: Interagency working is important, but so
is the ethos of the services provided through
children’s services. The interagency working seems,
in some ways, to have been fine in the Khyra Ishaq
case, and Maggie has remarked on the generally high
standard. Certainly the schools attended by the
children, who were starving to death, before some of
them were taken out, were doing everything possible
to raise the issue with social services. Social services
simply batted it away. Once the children were
withdrawn from school, social services seemed to
think that it had no role in welfare, because of
confusion caused by its lack of training and
understanding. That was in Birmingham, which is
one of the largest authorities in the country and
which has a record of sustained underperformance
in this area. How can we have confidence in social
services?
Colin Green: I’d like to add to that in a broader way,
rather than talking about a neighbouring local
authority. Clearly, because I work in Coventry, I
know a fair amount about Birmingham. First, there
are serious issues in the work force, and the key to
improvement is about improving the work force.
The work force, it is fair to say, has had decades of
neglect in terms of the key profession, which is the
social workers. Importantly, however, there are
others involved in that. The guidance and legislative
framework for child protection is sound, but it has
become enormously cluttered and excessively
elaborated. The work force weaknesses and that
elaboration are connected, because work force
weakness has been dealt with by trying to prescribe
the system in excruciating detail. In this case, which
obviously I have read something about, you can see
that people were following the process, but they were
not thinking. I think we have got too much process
and not enough thinking.
Q34 Chair: Social services did not follow the process,
though—they did not even know the process. They
thought that if a child was home educated, they did
not have a welfare role. They thought that that
welfare role was the home educated team’s job, but
it wasn’t and it never was. It was quite clear in all the
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guidelines on home education and on children
missing school, yet they were confused about the
most basic functions of their role in protecting
children. How was that possible?
Colin Green: It was possible because people get into
a tramline mindset in following the process. They
thought, “Ah, this is home education, I have
categorised it as that.” They did not think about it in
a broader sense, about understanding the meaning
of what had happened to that family and to many of
these other challenging families. Social services did
not try to understand why things were going
catastrophically wrong for these children who had
been reasonably well cared for, up to a certain point.
People were in their tramlines, and when you have
that mindset and a service under enormous pressure,
with—as we do currently—increased demand,
increased complexity and high expectations, that is
when things can go wrong.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: One of the things that I want
to add to what Colin has said is that when you
interview children who have had contact with the
system, they are remarkably consistent with what
Lord Laming had to say after the baby Peter case.
Professionals need not only to work with each other,
but to listen to what children are saying, listen
between the words of what children are saying—
sometimes there is a hidden disclosure going on—
not to take the adult’s word for what is being said,
to be consistent and approachable, and ready to be
accessed and to listen and to act on what a child says.
Very often, a child has screwed up their courage to
say what needs to be said about their home situation.
Lord Laming discussed maintaining professional
scepticism, going in with an eye for the child, not for
what the adult is telling you and for probing beneath
apparent compliance. There were many
recommendations from that report. What children
tell me as Children’s Commissioner is exactly what
Lord Laming told the country in that report.
Children find it difficult to disclose and they find it
difficult to put their parents in a situation where they
would feel that they were betraying them. There is a
need for the system to take the child’s interests first
and to always listen and look at what is going on.
One of the things that the Birmingham report
indicated was that they took the adult’s word too
easily. You have to get behind the adult and get to
the child.
Q35 Chair: A whole raft of children in that family
starved to death and suffered malnutrition, with
schools which were highlighting it. You didn’t need
to listen to the child; you just needed to see that they
couldn’t pay attention and that their trousers were
falling off them, to use one of their teacher’s phrases.
Somehow nothing happened.
Professor Frank Furedi: A couple of points from the
outside. Some questions were raised about process.
One of the problems with process is that it is not
straightforward when it becomes a substitute for
professional judgment. As a result, we have a
situation where leadership is measured on the basis
of how well you know the process, whereas the
underlings are the ones who need the process
interpreted to them. For example, a friend of mine
who is a legal scholar called the helpline of the
Criminal Records Bureau to find out what the law
was and she had to wait an hour and a half before
she was given any kind of answer, because the person
at the other end had no idea what process
should have been followed. You get conflicting
interpretation. One of the problems that we have had
in Haringey, apparently, and elsewhere is that the
one-dimensional dependence on process leads to a
lot of impression management—a lot of rituals of
pretending to do things that are not actually
happening. Children are let down because of that.
Another issue that the review should consider is
inter-agency co-operation. At the moment, that has
become a form of outsourcing authority and
responsibility to somebody else—somebody else will
do it. We are seeing that although it is a very good
idea in the abstract to co-operate and to have all
these little committees where we sit together, it
becomes a way of bypassing responsibility for
whatever is going on. That issue needs to be
confronted and it comes up time and again in almost
all of these cases.
Q36 Lisa Nandy: I want briefly to follow up on the
point that you raised, Maggie, about the voice of the
child. Sometimes it is not just about listening to
children, it is also about making sure that that voice
is elevated to a level where it is heard and put at the
heart of the intervention. We have seen time and
again with these high-profile cases that the voice of
the child has not been at the centre of the
intervention and has not been heard, despite the fact
that they were saying things that ought to have been
listened to. Do you think that there is a particular
role for the Children’s Commissioner in highlighting
that voice, particularly in areas where children’s
voices are not routinely heard, such as in custody
and in immigration detention?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: There is a very central role for
the Children’s Commissioner. We are under review,
but we will say that there continues to be a role in
elevating that voice. One of our current roles is in
helping Eileen Munro in her review by bringing
children and young people into her research
environment. We have not only been getting them to
answer questions formally, but we have held several
evidence sessions, where members of her research
team have come to listen to children who have
experience of the system. What those children are
saying is, for me, a blueprint model for what the
profession ought to look like. They are saying:
“Make it consistent—do not chop and change;” “Do
not assume that when you have solved the first
problem, the family is healed and you can simply
walk away;” “Do not close the case just because I no
longer ticks your boxes;” “I need you to continue to
be with me and to listen;” “I have had my case
opened and closed enough times now;” “Stay with
me, be consistent, make it happen for me;” “Broker
my access to other agencies;” and “I’m a young
carer, I’m looking after my mum, who has a mental
health problem. Don’t just walk away when you’ve
looked at my mum—I need help as well.” What we
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submit to the Munro review, which is heavily
influenced by the voices of children who have had
experience of the system, will be very much a
blueprint for the profession. That is one concrete
indicator of how the Children’s Commissioner’s
office can influence what happens in professional
development and training. We think that children
who have experience of the system should be used in
helping to define whether somebody who is entering
social work training has the mindset to work with
children and young people in the first place. We
think that children and young people’s voices from
the youth justice system could and should be
pushing the Youth Justice Board and others towards
only ever employing people, in lock-up situations,
who have declared themselves wishing to work with
children, and not just as a prison officer. You know
that we had influence on the situation for asylum
seekers and the end of detention, because Damian
Green has said so. Those are really important roles
for the Commissioner. Children who are in difficulty,
in danger, or at risk find it very difficult to lie about
their personal circumstances, so their voices are very
powerful. We quote them extensively in everything
that we publish and send to MPs, so you are
welcome to read what we do.
Q37 Lisa Nandy: Thank you. I also want to touch on
the issue about the social work profession, because
how we empower social workers to do their jobs is
particularly important. It has been established
beyond doubt that the high-profile cases, in
particular the baby Peter case, have had a really
demoralising effect on the social work profession. I
want to ask all of you on the panel whether you
would accept that? On the issue of media coverage,
what do you think the impact of it has been, and
what could have been done differently that might
have protected the social work profession from such
effects in those cases?
Colin Green: May I start on that? Certainly, it has
had a big effect on the social work profession, which
of course is far wider than children’s services—there
are thousands of social workers working with adults,
people with learning disabilities and people with
disabilities. It has had a big impact for children’s
services, as did the Victoria Climbie´ case and as have
a number of horrific cases over the past 30, 40 or
more years. The response to that, of trying to rebuild
the social work profession, and the work that Eileen
Munro is doing, which there is considerable
optimism about, are important steps in trying to put
some of that right. In terms of the media, I have
spent considerable time thinking about this. In
Coventry, we have taken a number of initiatives in
this area. Social workers have, because of what has
happened, shied away from explaining what they do
to the media and from allowing the media in, there
needs to be more of that. You have to see the media
as essentially like the weather—you probably can’t
do a lot about it, but at least you can be prepared for
the kind of weather coming your way. So, there is
something about being well prepared and
understanding that perspective. But we need to be
proactive in trying to explain what we do—there are
real difficulties about that, but some of them can be
overcome—and in trying to help the media present
what we do with some balance, using those parts of
the media who are open to that approach.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: I would echo what Colin has
said. I would come back to saying that the most
powerful voices you have are the children and young
people themselves, if they are properly guided and
prepared, and if the media understand that they have
a responsibility to reflect back to the nation how
fantastic most of our children and young people
are—how well parented, looked after, nurtured and
brought up they are, how well schooled they are and
what contributions they are already making to
society as volunteers and in other ways. It is within
that context that the media should look, when the
light of heavy criticism needs to be shone. My issue
with the media is that, in this country, it seems that
good news is not news. That is a real issue, and no
doubt it is one for you in your constituencies and in
the roles you play. Good news isn’t news; it’s always
the bad news that makes the front page. That is a real
issue for children and young people as well,
including those who are exposed to the system that
we are talking about this morning, the safeguarding
system. They get to the stage, as you know, in our
work on transparency in the family courts, where
they say, “Why would I want to tell my story if I am
going to be portrayed as a broken child in a broken
society from a broken family in a broken estate? I am
not going to talk to anybody. I am not going to talk
to my lawyer or my social worker, if you let the press
at me.” We have to work with the media to get them
to the stage where not everything is tarred with the
same brush. Of the social workers that I left in
Gateshead at the end of February, I would say,
because we spent a lot of time with them, because
elected Members came to see them, because we
supported them and because we celebrated what
they did, as winners of awards in the council—we
had some of the longest staying social workers in the
country, including some who had been in Gateshead
for 27 years and who wouldn’t have wanted to go
anywhere else—that they were fantastic. They were
great because we celebrated them as, every now and
again, so did the local press. The picture of a
profession that is absolutely under the cosh, or living
under a stone somewhere, is not universal. There are
some real heroes, doing fantastic work every day,
and we need to find a way of getting the media to
say so.
Q38 Lisa Nandy: Do you think that we could do
more to promote that as well?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: Absolutely. Go and see the
teams. Get yourself out on a day with a preventive
worker, a youth offending worker or a social worker
who is attached to a children’s centre. Go and spend
some time with such teams, who will value you,
including just for having the name—“Such and such
an MP is coming to see us.” They will feel really
supported.
Professor Frank Furedi: There is a danger of missing
the big picture by pointing a finger at the media. Of
course, the media do horrific things as they did in the
Processed: 01-11-2010 20:47:32 Page Layout: COENEW [E] PPSysB Job: 005661 Unit: PAG1
Ev 10 Education Committee: Evidence
15 September 2010 Dr Maggie Atkinson, Professor Frank Furedi and Colin Green
Haringey case and they are responsible for
promoting all kinds of panic. But when you talk to
social workers, especially the more creative, dynamic
sort of social workers, you will find that what
demoralises them is not the occasional media
representation that they are uncomfortable with, but
the very fact that they spend a phenomenal amount
of their time not doing social work. So when Sharon
Shoesmith was talking earlier about her being
surprised by seeing all these people hanging around
the offices, that is not unusual. You often find that,
if you look at the amount of time a social worker
spends out with real people, it tends to be less and
less compared with the amount of paperwork you
are doing, and the extent to which you are forced to
cover your rear end rather than think creatively
about the job you are engaged in. That is what is
demoralising. I talk to my ex-students who went into
social work, but who have subsequently left social
work precisely for the reason that they got fed up
with not being social workers, but being petty little
pen-pushers.
Q39 Tessa Munt: I am quite interested in your
analogy of the weather and, if you can see the storm
coming, how much of an impact that storm has on
people’s behaviour, and since 2008 and the Baby
Peter case, looking at the reaction of the general
public and of the services to the possibility of a storm
coming? Have people changed their reactions, their
reporting and their actions as a result? Do you get
that sort of effect where stories happen? How do you
balance out people’s responsibility to report and
react to circumstances they may be aware of,
particularly the general public, but also the services
concerned?
Colin Green: It is quite hard to separate out some of
the components, but certainly one of the responses
is a very defensive response, a response that is about
compliance. In a sense, it is hard to separate out
some of the response that is about the media. It is
also about the response of the Government and the
regulators. The response of the regulator, Ofsted, is
often about compliance and too much talk, in a
sense, of “How did we get the process right” not
“Did we get the result right?” The two are linked in
the way they operate. While the media are more of a
storm, the regulator is more a kind of thing that is
with you all the time. It is about changing both, and
the regulator, the impact of the regulator, and the
wider comment in society are more of a constant
feature. So it is important that both get adjusted or
we make some change. We will have to have a more
positive discussion about what it is we want from our
safeguarding child protection system. What do we
think should happen in families with the most
serious difficulties and are really struggling to care
for their children? How do we want to intervene?
What risks are we willing to take around
intervention, and so on?
Q40 Tessa Munt: I was going to ask you about risk,
in particular, and whether attitudes have changed to
risk and whether they just change as a result of storm
or whether it is consistent. Has there been a change
of attitude to risk since 2008?
Colin Green: I think it is quite hard to unpack it
because there is some evidence that the rise in work
load started actually before November 2008 and
therefore other things were going on, some of which
are about improved recognition of things that are
harmful to children, in particular a much better
appreciation of the impact of domestic violence.
There has been a lot of attention on the long-term
impact of neglect, still an issue we don’t tackle as
well as we might. Those are part of the picture,
alongside possible impacts of the recession, possible
impacts of our society becoming much more
complex—certainly I would feel that in a major
urban area in terms of how diverse the population is,
how volatile it is in terms of people moving around.
All those things are making a difference. I am not
sure there is real evidence that we are necessarily
notably more risk averse in that sense, but we are
identifying more need and responding to that,
perhaps more assertively.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: I am on record in public as
regretting some of the “cotton-woolling” that goes
on of some of our children and young people. I am
in my mid-50s and as a child, I used to disappear for
a day at a time, climb trees, fall in water and all sorts
of things with kids my parents did not know, and I
was very pleased that they didn’t know them.
Twenty years ago, that was at the end of the street,
and only with children you knew. Ten years ago, it
was—maybe—a play area that your parents had
sight of, and then only with a select group of children
and young people. For some of our children these
days, there are the twin pressures of having
something to fill every minute—dance, horses, music
and goodness only knows what else—and only being
allowed to play in the garden if somebody can see
you. We have to get to the stage where we as a society
understand that childhood is childhood and needs to
be allowed to be so. That’s so whether you are
vulnerable, poor, affluent, disabled, or terribly able-
bodied and very bright—every child needs the right
to be a child. You have to work out between you, as
a family, what the length of the leash is on which
children are allowed to play. In families that are
dysfunctional and chaotic, or where children and
parents are not bonded or attached, the leash can
sometimes be far too long. That is the point at which
children become out of sight, out of mind and not
properly parented. It is also the point at which
parents either abdicate their responsibilities or claim
not to have them, and that happens not only in
difficult, inner-urban estates but elsewhere as well. It
seems to me we need a national conversation about
what childhood is for. Who are the adults in this
situation, and how do we keep our children safe
without so locking them behind closed doors that
nobody actually knows how safe they are and they
are not taught risk as opposed to foolhardiness? We
need an ongoing national conversation about those
things, because it is about rearing, educating, health
and everything in between.
Chair: Can we bring Frank in on this?
Professor Frank Furedi: There is no doubt about the
fact that we have become steadily more risk averse.
When I wrote my study, “Paranoid Parenting”, in
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2001, there were many things that children could do
that are now no-go areas. Every week, I get four or
five e-mails from parents telling me that they have
been reported to the headmaster, the police, or to
somebody in local government, simply for trying to
give their children independence—getting their kids
to walk to school. The other day, I got an e-mail from
somebody in Kent. She had been planning for
months to get her daughter, a 13-year-old girl, to
come up to London for the first time, with another
13-year-old girl. It was a big day for them, but they
got into trouble because of that. It seems that we
have an intensification of risk aversion, which hides
something more profound, which is responsibility
aversion. When we deny children the opportunity to
engage with risk, we are saying “No, you cannot do
it. Don’t go outside. It’s impossible to do it”. It is
much easier to say that and not take responsibility
for our kids than to work out ways in which children
can manage that risk for themselves, so that they live
in a community where it is expected of all adults to
be responsible for their welfare. Instead, we have
created the situation where adults have become
entirely estranged—physically estranged—from
children. They are no longer allowed to go anywhere
near kids. You literally need a licence to be near a
child. As a result, perversely, children are far less
secure. We have to remember that even if you have 1
or 2 million social workers, in the end, the safety and
security of children depends on the quality of
communities, and the responsibility that
communities take for them. Risk aversion, which
really means responsibility aversion, has the
paradoxical consequence of compromising our
children’s existential life.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: I think we are generalising
from the specific very much in what has just been
said. We cannot, as a society say at one minute,
“They are locked away and never allowed to take
risks”, and the next minute, ask, “What are they
doing outside my house playing football?” Are these
the same children or are they not the same children?
We need a balanced conversation about how to keep
children safe without absolutely locking them down,
and we need a balanced inter-generational
conversation about how best to approach
youngsters who are simply being children in our
communities, not out to cause trouble because
there’s more than three of them. It is more subtle and
complex than is being portrayed to my right.
Professor Frank Furedi: I don’t know about subtlety
and complexity, but all I know is that if you now
have mums who want to go into the playgrounds of
their schools, and they are told that they cannot
enter unless they are CRB checked, there is no subtle
balance. If you talk to the headmaster about it and
say, “Why are you not allowing this woman to go
into the playground?” and he talks about process
and everything else, and instead of being
embarrassed, says, “I’m just being sensible about it”
that is not subtle or complex. When you have a
situation where children, who used to be able to
bicycle or walk to school, are now regarded as
eccentric if they do so, and their parents are regarded
as irresponsible, that is not a subtle or complex
situation. What we are doing is creating a world
where children are forced into their digital bedroom
more and more. At the same time, we have a small
minority of children who are tremendously at risk,
and who are also suffering from the fact that adults
in their communities no longer keep an eye on them,
because they think it’s not their business any more.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: The generalisation I would
point out is that there are 11.8 million of them. I got
on the tube this morning, and it was full of children
going to school on their own. I walk the streets
around Southwark, where my office is, and there are
children walking from school to home and from
home to school all the time on their own. If there are
11.8 million of them, not all of them can be as has
just been characterised—that is my issue.
Q41 Damian Hinds: We would all recognise some
aspects of the obsession with “credentialisation”,
process and so on. As a candidate, I remember
visiting schools and being asked whether I was CRB
checked, which I thought was absolutely ludicrous.
I was more interested in what Maggie was saying
about the need for a national conversation, and that
we as a society need to talk about these things. In my
experience, people are talking about them, and there
is a national conversation going on. All sorts of
sensible and normal people say that some of these
things have got completely out of hand. As
Children’s Commissioner, what do you think should
be done about that?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: Many of the changes that
Roger Singleton steered through before he stepped
down, particularly the vetting and barring scheme,
were good developments. It is sensible to stand back
from the vetting and barring scheme, as is happening
now—as we speak—to look at what we actually
need. But I would remind the Committee why the
vetting and barring scheme was introduced in the
first place. It was introduced after the murders of
two little girls by their school caretaker. As a nation,
we need to work out where between the two extremes
of “lock them down” and “don’t lock them down”
we are actually going to sit. That is why the
conversation that you have just characterised, which
is ongoing, is important.
Q42 Damian Hinds: I meant in terms of risk aversion
in general. Even people who complain about
children being outside their house are the same
people who say, “We want the children to have a
childhood.” You are the voice of youth, so what can
the public, government and local communities do to
turn that conversation, which has a large consensus,
into something that makes a difference for children?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: One of the great moments of
opportunity is with us at the moment. If localities are
having to make stringent cuts to things like how
many public buildings they run, one of the things
that is incumbent on them, and is entirely in line with
what all three parties were talking about in terms of
community development, is to bring the generations
together in a properly structured way to talk about
their communities and what is needed, which is what
children and young people are asking me. How do
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we make it possible for youngsters to play football
after dark without them being reported to the police
15 times by people who would rather have “No ball
games” signs than “Children welcome here” signs?
What children are asking for, particularly the
teenagers, is to be helped to talk to the older
generations in ways that frighten neither of them, in
proper community settings, usually with a project in
mind—“Can we turn this stretch of empty green
space into a community allotment?” or, “Is there a
way of us, as young people, helping you, as older
people, to keep the war memorial up to date and
clean and tidy?” or, “Can we work together on
community programmes that are about learning
about each other and learning together?” That is
what they are asking for. We are in a moment of
opportunity. If you cannot afford both a community
centre and a youth club and a this and a that and the
other, and you can only have one of those, you’re all
going to have to use it together, so how about we run
some properly structured programmes? There are
organisations that can help you do it—from the
voluntary sector, from academia and from the
schools in our communities—and who will help to
bring those generations together. It is happening
already in many parts of the country, and it does bear
fruit. It is very important, because the two ends of
the age scale characterise each other as not
understanding each other. Actually, it is about
bringing them into spaces where they learn to speak
each other’s language, and that is what children are
consistently asking for.
Professor Frank Furedi: Unfortunately, the
generations will not come together as long as we
believe that child protection is based upon the
vetting, monitoring and surveying of adults. As long
as adults feel that they are being viewed as potential
criminals they will feel estranged, and in many cases
will feel very awkward about physically coming near
children. It is a very big problem, particularly for the
older generation. When you talk to them they often
feel very uncomfortable about being with children
not because they do not want to be, but because they
are worried about how their behaviour will be
interpreted by other people. This is where politicians
and people like ourselves have a very important role
to play in encouraging some kind of cultural change
so that the default position is that we think adults are
responsible, decent people, rather than potential
paedophiles. I think we need to establish that, and
we need to act on that basis.
Q43 Chair: The culture change that has taken us in
that direction, about which there may or may not be
a consensus that it is the wrong one, was based on a
series of legislative and administrative process-based
actions, which tipped things that way. I think
Damian is trying to ask—rather than wishing a
culture change, which I don’t think we will effect
from this room, however persuasively we talk—what
actions need to be taken. It is like anything to do
with health and safety, where people say, “Tell us the
specific ones you want to withdraw, where you will
accept the increased risk by removing them,” when
it sounds as if it is there to protect small children, for
instance. You have to remove that and take it away,
and accept it in order to change the culture. Is that
true, and if so what should we do?
Professor Frank Furedi: We should take away the
vetting and barring scheme straight away, because it
creates more problems than it solves. We need a
sensible system for monitoring people who either
work full-time with children—teachers, social
workers and people of that sort—or who are
consistently exposed to them in specific areas of
volunteering. The inappropriate extension of the
scheme into other areas, which has happened in
recent years, is really where the problem is. We need
very specific forms of monitoring where this is really
explained. We also need to have somebody, either in
social services or elsewhere, whose job it is to police
the bureaucratic mechanisms that have been
established and keep them from getting out of hand
in the way that they have. Yesterday, for example,
one local government wrote a letter to parents
because they allowed their kids to walk to school. In
that instance, it would be their job to reprimand that
local authority for causing harm and creating
difficulties for the individuals concerned. We need to
bend the stick in the opposite direction.
Colin Green: I am afraid—
Chair: Colin, your body language is showing that
you fiercely disagree with that. We must move on or
we will not deal with other issues. I hate to cut you
off, especially when you have so obviously been
severely provoked.
Q44 Nic Dakin: I was provoked as well, but I will
move on. Is the publication of Serious Case Reviews
the right thing to do? Does it in itself bring about the
accountability that is desired, and how do we make
sure in those cases that surviving children are not
harmed by that publication?
Colin Green: First of all, it is important that there is
accountability, but I do not think that full
publication of Serious Case Reviews will achieve
accountability. The primary problem with this is
that—I am just trying to make sure I state this
clearly—what we have had, and the move towards
publication means that the focus of the Serious Case
Review will become on preparing a document for
publication, or preparing a document that will get
full marks from Ofsted. It will not be on learning, it
will not be on organisational change and it will not
be about what we really need to do differently in
those cases. I feel that publication is a costly exercise
that will not contribute either towards better
accountability or towards keeping children safer.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: I would add to that, and again
I am on public record as having already said this.
If it becomes an extremely process-driven and
document-driven and get-the-ticks-in-the-boxes-
driven exercise, how is it supposed to continue to
help to keep children safe, whether they are surviving
siblings or not? For me as Commissioner, the big
issue—because we see all of them—is the quality,
honesty, robustness and detail in the executive
summaries of Serious Case Reviews. To come back
to an issue raised earlier in this conversation, there
are partner agencies whose members would, I think,
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stand back from even allowing their documentation
to be used as part of a Serious Case Review if the
Damocles sword of potential publication and pillory
in the press was held over their heads. It is not an aid
to co-operation between agencies. The biggest insult
as far as children and young people who are
surviving siblings and have talked to us as an agency
are concerned is, “You are about to publish this, but
you have not talked to me about it. When were you
going to ask my opinion as a 13-year-old surviving
sibling in a desperately awful case? If you’re not
going to ask for my opinion, how do I respect you as
professionals in the system? Why would I want to?
All right then, I won’t tell my story.” How safe are
they if they are not going to tell their story because
of their fear of publication? If you are child B and
child A was the subject of a Serious Case Review and
you live in a tiny village in the back end of a dale in
north Yorkshire, everybody at your school is going
to know that you are child B even if your material is
redacted. It’s not a means of keeping children safe
and it won’t be a means of entirely assuring the
system that it will learn. If you want to make them
trials, then call them trials; Serious Case Reviews are
supposed to be learning exercises.
Colin Green: I would just add that in terms of the
issue of learning, the biennial reviews, where
research teams looked at all this, have been a very
powerful learning tool. That is the way to get the
learning out to a wider community in a systematic
way that has been synthesised and can give people a
focus on what they need to understand has gone
wrong and what we need to do differently.
Q45 Nic Dakin: Moving on from Serious Case
Reviews, has the abolition of the National
Safeguarding Delivery Unit, which Laming asked
for, been a loss to the promotion of good practice?
You might want to take that first, Colin.
Colin Green: I would say yes, because all the
National Safeguarding Delivery Unit did was bring
together the civil servants from across government
who had leads on safeguarding. I worked as a civil
servant on safeguarding for three years in the then
DfES, and one of the perennial issues was ensuring
that government departments worked together on
safeguarding, particularly the Home Office and the
Department of Health, but not just them. The
Safeguarding Delivery Unit brought those people
together and co-located them with some clarity of
common leadership. I thought that was potentially
really beneficial. It didn’t add anything to cost and
it wasn’t a quango—it was simply about bringing
people together so they could do their policy work
more effectively.
Q46 Nic Dakin: What should replace ContactPoint?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: In my last job in Gateshead, we
were a pilot area for ContactPoint and we saw that
it made a difference. Let’s just be clear what
ContactPoint is not: it is not a database full of case
records, case conference minutes or whatever. For
most children in this country, what ContactPoint did
was tell you who they were, when they were born,
where they lived, their GP reference number and
where they went to school. For most children, it was
simply one simple, central national record of where
they were. For those children who needed additional
services, it enabled me as, for example, an
Educational Welfare Officer, to get into the system
with three or four passwords to work out who else
had contact with that child. Children and young
people tell me, “I’m sick of telling my story five times
over. I need all these extra services, and I need to tell
my story once. Whoever’s doing it then needs to
work out who else needs to work in the team around
me.” If we are going to have a database only for the
vulnerable, I would like somebody somewhere to sit
me down and define “the vulnerable.” Do you mean
all four million in poverty? Do you mean all 1
million with a disability? Do you mean all however
many with a special need? Do you mean anybody
who comes home from work and suddenly their
dad’s not got a job and they’re about to be thrown
out of their house? Do you mean somebody whose
family has suddenly broken up? Define me “the
vulnerable” and where one is not and one is
vulnerable and I’ll tell you that we can only have a
database for the vulnerable. It is really important
that we have something simple, clear and fast.
Q47 Nic Dakin: Are you essentially saying that
ContactPoint was that something, or were people
right to be critical of it and do we need something
else?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: For us in Gateshead, it was
that something and I could show you concrete proof
of finding a child who had gone missing in another
borough, because they came in to us and we knew
what their national health number was and we found
them within 48 hours. And they were in danger.
Colin Green: I was more sceptical about whether
ContactPoint would ever work quite in the way that
Maggie has described. I am more sceptical about
whether we can construct something else that is
somewhere between the list of children who have a
child protection plan and all children, for the reasons
Maggie has very briefly outlined. It is also for me, in
what are going to be hard times, about the
opportunity cost of trying to create yet another
technical system. My concern with ContactPoint is
and always was that it was yet another technical fix
for what I see as essentially a human problem, which
is about people recognising they have information
that needs to be shared and that they need to go and
talk to other people to whom that might be useful,
and vice versa. That really is my concern. The effort
needs to go into the training and development of the
work force, so that they understand who they need
to talk to and do that in a proactive way.
Professor Frank Furedi: In addition, from a
sociological point of view, there are a number of
other reasons why it is a really horrible idea. One is
that it tends to fossilise identity and leads to a
situation where what is on the screen is the child,
rather than the living creature that is out there. That
often tells us that random databases are a very
illusory way of dealing with child protection, or for
any social problem for that matter. It is a lazy way of
going about the whole process.
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Dr Maggie Atkinson: Chair, I have to come back.
Professor Frank Furedi: Secondly, there is a
tendency, when you have databases, to invite more
information and other people’s suspicions, and
notes also get on it. So databases very rarely stay
still. They tend to expand with the passing of time
until you get to the point where, especially when you
come to more subtle nuance issues, they become a
little bit unreliable. That seems to me to be a danger.
From a non-sociological point of view, it is a civil
liberty issue. A society that has to put all the children
on a database is basically saying that we are a sick
society—that this is the only way we can proceed.
That is a form of self-condemnation that I am really
surprised that enlightened practitioners are
comfortable living with.
Q48 Nic Dakin: May I move on to one last area,
which is the Munro review? There has been review
upon review upon review in this area. Do we need
another review and, if we do, has this got the right
remit?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: We do need another review and
this builds on what Moira Gibb’s Social Work
Taskforce did in such sterling fashion, but what
Moira and her team were looking at was the
structure of the profession. The really positive thing
that Eileen has been asked to look at is the nature of
front-line practice. What that then enables you to do
is to listen to the voice of the client of that front-line
practice. That enables you to then re-shape the
front-line practice to tackle exactly what Frank
raised, which is too much time away from the client
transforming into better time with the client—staff
who do not know what the profile of a social worker
should look like being told from the horse’s mouth
of the client’s experience what a social worker
should look like. Eileen has been asked to do it in a
very short period of time. She has been asked to give
concrete recommendations on how the profession
ought to move into the 21st century. This is the
finishing point of the work that Moira Gibb did
leading up to this.
Colin Green: I would agree with all of that. It is a very
wide remit, so there are some concerns about
whether there is the time to cover such an enormous
scope. I feel that it is more practice-focused. Also,
given the direction she comes from with her
academic research and interest, we know it will be
focused on practice and be a systematic and human
look at what actually happens and why things go
wrong. We will not get 100 recommendations about
process and procedure.
Professor Frank Furedi: She is unusually sensible for
an academic, so I completely agree with the two
comments.
Q49 Chair: Are the current levels of safeguarding
activity—as we know, it has gone up a great deal
since 2008, for whatever reason—sustainable, given
what we know about local authority budgets? Is it
reasonable for us to expect that funding for
preventive and early intervention services might
suffer as a result of the expected reductions?
Colin Green: To put it another way round, the
activity is there; the question is, can local
government and the partners sustainably respond to
that level of activity? The answer at the moment is
that it is proving very challenging to respond to that
level of activity and do it to a reasonable standard.
That is really the crux, because a lot of the issue is
that where things get into serious difficulties, there
are often problems about the sheer capacity of the
system and of people to do the work, and to do the
work well. If you’re looking at social worker case
loads, health visitor work loads or work loads in
police public protection units, all those are up, and
that leads to compromises on quality. One of the
quality issues, of course, is about the quality of
recording. Although I agree that people spend too
much time at their desks, this is an area that requires
very careful recording. These are children’s lives.
There may be critical decisions made, on the basis of
records, on whether children may be separated from
parents, and so on. It’s a real concern. I think it is
quite possible we will be in a scenario where
preventive services will go, because of the need to
maintain the child protection services and services to
look after the children who are already in our care.
Once you have a child in your care, you have got to
provide a service. That is a very costly service, and it
may well squeeze out other services for children and
young people.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: My warning to the system has
been consistent since I took up office: be careful
what you wish for when you start to cut preventive
and early intervention services. The very services
Colin has just carefully and eloquently described will
then be even more swamped than they are now,
because there is no diversion or dilution of
behaviours and no early intervention in families
who, if you got in early enough, would recover. I
recognise that every public service, my own
organisation included, is having to face some very
tough decisions about what we spend and how we
spend it. If you simply take the easy way of cutting
the discretionary and the universal, you will live to
regret the day you did it.
Q50 Ian Mearns: I have often been made aware of
the tension between the levels of need driving the
service and the resources available. We’ve been
through some very difficult times recently in
children’s services—Sharon’s still sitting there
listening to all this. We have heard about the recent
history of demands on services and the breadth of
the role of Director of Children’s Services within a
local authority—I think it was John Bangs from the
NUT who described it as “undoable” in evidence to
this Committee in its previous life. Given all these
tensions between resources and needs and the times
that we’re in, is it going to become more difficult to
recruit people who are capable of fulfilling the duty
of a Director of Children’s Services into the future?
Are you finding any sort of wastage in the system
where people are bailing out because of the demands
on them as individuals?
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Colin Green: There has certainly been, I would say in
the last year, a change in about 40 local authorities
in Directors of Children’s Services. That was a full
mix of retirements, people moving between
authorities and so on, so it is quite a high rate of
churn. To be frank, I don’t know how hard it is to
recruit. I certainly know a number of authorities
have had to look pretty hard, and maybe go out a
couple of times, so I think the demands of the job are
reflected in that way, but the National College for
Leadership of Schools and Children’s Services, or
whatever it’s now called, is doing a lot of work to try
to ensure that there are people coming through who
have been prepared for the role.
Dr Maggie Atkinson: I’d add to that that there is
certainly a breadth and depth of talent in the system.
It is about the current generation of directors not
portraying the sense of hero leadership. I come back
to what Colin said earlier: this is a team effort. You
can’t keep the whole of the job in your head.
Witnesses: Tim Loughton MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Children and Families, and
Dr Jeanette Pugh, Director, Safeguarding Group, Department for Education, gave evidence.
Q52 Chair: Thank you both for joining us this
morning, Dr Jeanette Pugh and Tim Loughton MP.
It is a pleasure, Minister, to have you here for your
first appearance before us after taking office. Lord
Laming said that what was required now was to—I
think he said—“Just do it”, echoing Nike or
whatever. Why, after Lord Laming’s Social Work
Taskforce and all the other reviews and efforts, have
you decided to have another review instead of just
getting on with it?
Tim Loughton: Perhaps I can make three
introductory remarks, and then address that entirely.
Thank you, Chair, for introducing Jeanette Pugh,
who is here as my minder. She is the director of
safeguarding at the Department for Education, and
a very excellent one at that. First, I really welcome
the review that the Committee is doing. It is a really
important issue. Child safeguarding and the
protection of vulnerable families is a very important
part of the work of the Department. It does not get
the recognition it deserves in Parliament more
generally, and I think the Committee’s work will
help to resolve that. Secondly, this is a very
important issue for me and for our part of the
coalition, in particular. For several years before the
election, we did a lot of work around social workers
and child protection. The commission on the future
of children’s social workers, which I chaired back in
2007, produced a report, No More Blame Game, and
a second report in response to the Laming inquiry in
2009, and we then produced a document called Back
to the Frontline in February this year, ahead of the
election, so there is quite a lot of form in this area—
it isn’t something that’s just happened. Why I think
it is particularly good this inquiry is happening now
is that it’s not a knee-jerk reaction to another
tragedy that has just happened, which is usually the
only time we get a focus on this particular area. On
Somebody else has to step up in very senior roles and
have exposure to elected members, partners and
other things, so that they are ready to take it on and
can see it as a possible next step. There is a vast array
of talent out there, and I come back to what I said
earlier. That’s why most children’s services
departments are extremely good.
Q51 Ian Mearns: Given the collegiate approach that
is necessary, and the requirement to fulfil the role and
provide the services adequately, you would need
different agencies to work together. Given all of that,
do you think it’s therefore reasonable that a Director
of Children’s Services is ultimately accountable for
everything that happens on their patch?
Dr Maggie Atkinson: I’d say an unequivocal yes. I
always saw myself as being absolutely where the
buck stopped.
Chair: I think we will bring this session to a close.
Thank you all very much for giving evidence to us
this morning.
the third thing—and then responding to your
question about why don’t we just do it—I think
we’ve done an awful lot in the first four months of
this Government. Within the first 100 days, we had
set up the Eileen Munro review—no doubt we’ll
have more questions on that—which I think is
absolutely crucial. We had established the new
regulations for publication in full of serious case
reviews, and the first of those was published
retrospectively at the end of July with the Khyra
Ishaq case, and I think that that was a very positive
and widely welcomed move. And, on 6 August, I
gave the order to switch off ContactPoint—again
something that was a clear undertaking in the
coalition agreement and in the manifesto
commitments of the two coalition parties. Added to
that, the vetting and barring review is under way,
which is very germane to safeguarding; I’ve been
doing various things around fostering regulations;
there is the family law review, which is essential for
CAFCASS, which is very much a part of this area—
and so on and so forth. So there is an awful lot we
have done at a very early stage in this new
Government.
Q53 Chair: What will the review cover that Lord
Laming didn’t?
Tim Loughton: What is different about Eileen
Munro’s review? The first reaction to it was twofold:
first, “Oh no, not another review” and, secondly,
“Does that mean that all the very good work done
by Moira Gibb and the Social Work Taskforce is
going to be junked?” My response to that is no, this
is complementary to the work of the Social Work
Reform Board and all the excellent work that Moira
Gibb has done. The very first person that Eileen
Munro went to see was Moira Gibb, and one of the
people from her reform board is serving on the
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reference group. Secondly, on why it’s different, so
many reviews in the past have been knee-jerk
reactions—a disaster has happened and something
must be done about it. There’s a big review, and the
result of that is usually several hundred extra pages
of regulations added to the rulebook. I believe those
regulations have added to the problem and resulted
in social workers and other key professionals
spending up to 80% of their time attending to
processes, usually in front of their computer. What I
think Eileen Munro will come up with—I am in the
slightly difficult position of not wanting to prejudge
her final report, let alone her initial scoping report,
which is due out on 1 October—will, I hope, be to get
rid of a lot of those regulations, or to say that,
actually, this stuff is standing in the way of better
child protection and we can do it better with fewer
regulations, relying on the common sense, the good
training, good practice and professionalism of social
workers and other professionals, if we just allow
them to get on with the job of being social workers.
Q54 Chair: Is the brief that Professor Munro has had
from Ministers such that she will feel constrained by
the financial circumstances we’re in, or does she have
carte blanche to recommend those things, however
expensive, that she feels need to be put in place to
protect children?
Tim Loughton: I made it absolutely clear, as did the
Secretary of State when he wrote to Eileen Munro
confirming her appointment, that she has absolutely
carte blanche. There are two things we’ve given her,
effectively. One is a destination, and that destination
is to come up with a system that protects children
better by freeing up social workers and other
professionals to spend more of their time eyeballing
the people they are there to protect at the front line,
and able to make well informed value judgments,
some of which will be wrong, but they will be better
informed value judgments that their professional
training leads them to be able to make. That’s the
destination point. We gave her a couple of
landmarks, if you will, and that is that we are
scrapping—have scrapped—ContactPoint, and
secondly, that we will publish, and are publishing,
serious case reviews. As to where she goes from
there, it’s entirely up to her. There will be areas that
she feels the need to look at in terms of inspection
and training, what other professionals are doing and
so on, and it’s entirely up to her to do that.
Q55 Nic Dakin: We have just heard from the
professionals about the publication of serious case
reviews and the concern about going down exactly
the legalistic line that you’ve described previous
initiatives doing. How can we be confident that that
won’t be the case?
Tim Loughton: I entirely disagree with that
sentiment. If the contention is that it would all be
about preparing for the serious case review, up to
now it’s been all about preparing for the executive
summary of the serious case review, which is the only
public face of that investigation. As we have seen,
very manifestly in the case of the Edlington Serious
Case Review, where the leaked full report to
“Newsnight” showed that there was very little, if
any, relationship between the 150-page full serious
case overview and the 12-page executive summary, it
absolutely showed that there was no confidence in
serious case reviews really being a learning exercise,
as they should be. I believe we’ve got to the stage
where public confidence in child protection in this
country is so completely shot, and the ramification
of that is that confidence in the profession and on the
part of the profession in itself is at an all-time low,
which I think is a really very serious matter that we
need to address and what Munro is really going to
address. Only full transparency of serious case
reviews will start to rehabilitate the image of child
protection in the eyes of the public, and therefore
start to rehabilitate the reputation of those involved
in doing something about it, particularly social
workers. I think those who will benefit most from the
full publication of serious case reviews will be social
workers. Let’s face it, whether they are published or
not, most of the details of the high-profile cases
appear on the front page of the tabloids or on the
internet. The full details are actually there. When
you see the full serious case review—I have now been
able to read some, and every executive summary of
a serious case review now comes via my desk for me
to look at them, and there are 130 of those a year at
the moment—you will see that, actually, okay, there
were some problems and mistakes made by social
workers, but actually the police didn’t do a very
good job, or the school was at fault, or the GP or the
paediatrician in the A and E department mucked up.
I am not looking at pointing blame. I am looking for
a fairer apportionment of responsibilities, so that all
the partners know that they have to pull their socks
up too.
Q56 Nic Dakin: We are also aware that there is a lot
of pressure on funding and resources. How can we be
confident that the capacity will remain in the system
for effective early intervention, so that we get less of
these things happening?
Tim Loughton: I entirely agree with the comments
that Maggie Atkinson made in terms of the good
investment that early intervention is about. One of
my jobs in our Department is to ensure that we make
that strong case in our discussions with the Treasury
and to say that it is a false economy not to intervene
early. That is also what the Munro review is about—
to ensure that social workers can intervene early, so
that the first knock on the door by the social worker
is not signalling the initiation of care proceedings but
actually saying, “We’re here to help. How can we
work with you supportively and bring in additional
services?” We want to ensure, as much as possible,
that families can stay together, rather than the
children having to be taken into care because it has
all gone pear-shaped and we are intervening too late
in the day. A lot of money is being wasted at the
moment, though, because of the high vacancy rates
and the high absentee rates of social workers, due to
sickness and everything. We are paying a huge
premium for the turnover in social workers, for the
cover provided by agency social workers and for the
fact that so much money is being spent on processes
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and paperwork. If we get rid of a lot of that so much
more time can be spent at the sharp end and
hopefully social workers will feel rather more
invigorated and confident in their job, and more
people will want to come into the job and stay in it.
Q57 Nic Dakin: So what practical steps are the
Government proposing to improve the capacity of
the front line, in a context in which there will be no
more money?
Tim Loughton: First, we released £23 million of
social work reform money, which is all about
improving training and retention of staff at the sharp
end. That has been absolutely welcome. I need to
argue, and I have been arguing, the case that we need
to have some resources available for what Eileen
Munro comes up with, particularly in the early
stages. Otherwise it would be a meaningless review,
if she came up with lots of what I think are lots of
practical and whizzy ideas only to be told, “Well,
that’s all very nice, but actually there’s no money in
the pot.” As I say, though, I think that actually there
is a financial gain to be made here in quite short
order, whereby if we get it right in social work we
instantly get rid of a lot of the waste. We speed up the
courts system, where there are delays because a
social worker is not available to turn up in court,
because the paperwork has gone missing, or because
it is a new social worker assigned to the case so they
have to go back to first base. That is where so much
money is wasted, and while that time delay exists the
problem is being exacerbated such that a more
expensive permanent care option may be the only
solution by the end of the day.
Q58 Nic Dakin: So you are very clear that resources
will be there to fund what comes out of the Munro
report, to ensure that the problems with vacancies,
management and so on and so forth, which you very
clearly described, will be addressed in short order?
Tim Loughton: I am very clear that I am making that
case to the Treasury. As for whether or not the
Treasury has completely taken that case on board,
that will become clearer after 20 October.
Q59 Tessa Munt: Can I pick up on some of the issues
related to serious case reviews? In Maggie’s
comments—I know you were here then for them—
she talked about the impact on the survivors, if you
like, and the siblings of such a situation. How do you
answer that potential criticism, that it is not very
effective to publish? Secondly, why do you choose to
publish serious case reviews? I ask because, as you
have identified, if those case reviews come across
your desk and you can see that the executive
summary is different from the content of the report,
it strikes me that it is possible for you to instruct that
the executive summary be written accurately and the
executive summary could be published without the
content of the document itself, because of the
implications that publishing the content has. We
have heard already about the potential fear among
the people who are involved of the impact of
publication. I just want to explore that a little more,
if I may.
Tim Loughton: I will take that second part first,
Tessa. It is the role of Ofsted to inspect the serious
case reviews, both the executive summary and the
full overviews in any case. It can obviously rate one
as unsatisfactory and then it would have to be done
again. There is the whole question—this is
something that the Munro review will look at—
about the capacity of Ofsted to inspect serious case
reviews, which came up in the Haringey case. The
first executive summary was deemed to be okay until
all the subsequent information came out, and then it
wasn’t worth the paper that it was written on. I see
all the executive summaries at the moment. For
some serious case reviews, where there are wider
implications, I will ask to look at the full review as
well. All of them, apart from the four cases that we
said should be published retrospectively, were
initiated pre-10 June, which is the date that we
announced that future serious case reviews should be
published. I go back to the point that I made to Nic
Dakin earlier that the credibility of the child
protection system requires greater publication
transparency to the public in the future. I want to get
to a stage where the public are not interested in the
latest baby death tragedy because they are confident
that a serious case review is there, warts and all,
available for all those professionals at the sharp end
and for others who are interested to take a real
interest in, and that things have not somehow been
swept under the carpet. There is a fear about the
culture of secrecy, which surrounds a lot of serious
case reviews, that has led people to be entirely
cynical that any lessons will be learned and to believe
that it is another whitewash, that there are the same
old regular suspects and that nothing ever happens
about it. We need to improve serious case reviews.
Eileen Munro will be looking at whether the format
of serious case reviews is the right one. Can we learn
from either the different models that the SCIE is
looking at at the moment or the way in which they
do it in America—the different narrative to the
serious case reviews? I don’t think the reviews are the
best way of doing it anyway. They were introduced
in 1988 as a replacement for having a full inquiry
into every suspicious child death. We also need to
consider the way in which they are audited. Should
we go back in a year’s time to do a checklist to see
whether things that were suggested in the
recommendations have been done? The authorship
of serious case reviews needs to be looked at. How
can we be guaranteed that the quality, independence
and arm’s-length position of the author from the
LSCB is guaranteed? We need to look at all those
things, and Eileen Munro will be looking at them.
Your first point, which is a very valid point, is that
we did not just say that every serious case review will
be published and bulldoze that through regardless,
and we certainly did not say that retrospectively
every one will now be published. There would have
been no time for any social workers in any local
authority children’s department in the country to do
any social work if they had had to go retrospectively
through all those reports. We chose instead to
highlight four high-profile cases that had very wide
ramifications for the way in which we are doing child
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protection in this country and say that they should
be published, of which one has been published
already. We said that they should be published
subject to anonymisation, to appropriate redaction
and, crucially, to there being no threat to the welfare
of a surviving child or siblings. There may well be
future cases in which the LSCB can make out a
special case for why the full publication of that
serious case review could go against that third
criteria. Indeed, one of the retrospective reports that
we are considering having published may come
under that bracket. If it does, it won’t be published.
However, I would say that, if you look at the model
of mental health homicide reports, which have been
published in full for many years, there hasn’t been a
problem. They refer to Dr A, Nurse B and Patient C
or whatever, and are a very thorough and
transparent learning tool. If we can do it for mental
health homicides, why can we not do something
similar for child deaths and child harm?
Q60 Lisa Nandy: I want to return to the question of
resources. The Government spend an enormous
amount of money each year on locking up children
in immigration detention. It has been documented
beyond any doubt that that horrific practice causes
long-lasting harm to children and cannot be
justified. Your Government made a very welcome
commitment in May that that practice would end.
That was May and this is September. Five months
later, why is this horrific practice still going on?
Tim Loughton: First, it is not a matter for me. There
was a clear commitment in the coalition agreement,
and the progress on that has been outlined by
Damian Green as the responsible Minister.
Absolutely, it is the intention to bring that practice
to an end as quickly as possible. I entirely agree with
your sentiments. As for the exact mechanics about
the timing, that is a matter for the Home Office and
the Immigration Minister.
Q61 Lisa Nandy: I am a little concerned about that
answer, because one of the key things that the
creation of the Department for Children, Schools
and Families did was bring together under one roof
responsibility for all children. For some children left
out of that equation alternative arrangements were
made, but for others no arrangements were made,
including this group of children in particular. Are
you telling the Committee that this group of children
is not a priority for your Department?
Tim Loughton: Absolutely not. I am saying that the
mechanics of bringing that practice to an end, the
timing and the practicalities are a direct
responsibility of the Home Office and the Minister
for Immigration, with whom I have had
conversations. He is entirely aware of my
sentiments, which are the sentiments of my
Department and which coincide with your own
feelings, as you expressed. So absolutely, we have
serious concern about the future of that group of
children and want to see the situation brought to an
end as quickly as possible.
Q62 Lisa Nandy: Can you tell the Committee when
the practice will end?
Tim Loughton: I can’t, because it won’t be me
signing it off. However, I am putting as much
pressure as I can from my Department on to the
Home Office to bring it to an end as quickly as
possible.
Q63 Lisa Nandy: Are you concerned about your lack
of ability as a Minister who is responsible for
children to influence what is happening to that group
of children right now?
Tim Loughton: No, I don’t think so. I have every
confidence that the Minister for Immigration is
absolutely committed to bring the practice to an end
as soon as possible. I don’t think there is a conflict
of policy here at all. It was a clear coalition
agreement. It remains a clear coalition undertaking.
It remains a clear obligation of the Minister for
Immigration, as the front-line Minister responsible,
to do that as soon as possible, in full measure.
Dr Jeanette Pugh: If I may say, to reassure the
Committee, I have been working closely with a
ministerial colleague, Sarah Teather, on this—
indeed, were it not for this Select Committee this
morning, at this very moment I would be at a senior
programme board dealing with this issue at the
Home Office. Unfortunately, I had to give my
apologies because I am here, but the very first e-mail
that I sent this morning was to my opposite number
at the Home Office, arranging for a further meeting
with him about the matter next week. We are
working very closely with colleagues in UKBA and
the Home Office to deliver this commitment, on
which we are absolutely determined to make the
most progress possible, through the review and by
working with UKBA and a range of NGOs. I can
certainly give you my absolute assurance on that.
Q64 Lisa Nandy: What concerns me about your
answers is that this very specific practice raises wider
questions about the commitment to safeguarding
children. Essentially, we have a group of children,
today, who are being harmed at the hands of the
state. My question for you is, if safeguarding is top
priority for this Department, why has that practice
not been ended?
Tim Loughton: Lisa, I think you’re looking for a
problem that’s not there. There is no suggestion of
any demurring about that commitment. All the
things that I have outlined so far express in tangible
terms a huge undertaking of child protection and
safeguarding vulnerable families that we initiated in
the Department for Education in our first 100 days.
Absolutely, we hit the ground running. The first visit
the Secretary of State paid on becoming Secretary of
State was to a group of child protection social
workers in Hammersmith, for example. Having been
quite a cynic in opposition about how government
works, I have been absolutely amazed at just how
quickly we have been able to bring about some of
these things that we were committed to in
opposition, and at how we have already set a very
tight timetable for Professor Munro, the family law
review and some of the other reviews. We don’t want
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to kick them into the long grass. I want to make these
changes because I don’t think that vulnerable
children in this country are any safer now than they
were on 25 February 2000, when Victoria Climbie´
lost her life in tragic circumstances. Despite an
enormous amount of good will and good intentions
on the part of the previous Government and all
parties, and a huge amount of legislation concerning
children—every piece of which I served on in
opposition since 2001—we are not getting it right,
and I want to get it right. It is a priority of my
Department that we get it right.
Q65 Lisa Nandy: I simply put it to you that you will
be judged on the record of how you protect the most
vulnerable, and I haven’t heard anything yet about
that particular group of children, of whom Victoria
Climbie´ was one—a child brought into this country
from abroad—to suggest that your Department is
sufficiently involved with that issue. It was an
unequivocal commitment in May that the detention
of children must end. Yet five months later, there is
no clear rationale for why that practice continues.
There are children in immigration detention now. I
put it to you that that is a problem that really does
exist.
Tim Loughton: And it existed in the previous 13
years of the last Government, when no action took
place. It will happen, but in the first 100 days, the
clear coalition agreement commitments—to abolish
ContactPoint, to publish Serious Case Reviews and
to get under way a serious review of child
protection—have already happened. I think that
that is pretty impressive, and absolutely shows the
commitment in our Department to getting on with
it.
Q66 Damian Hinds: There has been something
threading through all three evidence sessions we’ve
had this morning, which is very important, about
inter-agency working, joined-up thinking,
collaboration, computer systems that let people see
what notes other people have taken, and all the rest
of it. One thing I don’t think we have heard much
about at all is the individual ownership of cases—
responsibility. It strikes me that in most
organisations if you really want something to
happen you don’t give it to a group or a committee.
You may involve lots of people. You may want
people working across departments; you probably
even want them working outside the organisation,
with other organisations; but ultimately one person
owns the problem or issue. I wonder, Minister, if you
might say a few words on your thinking on that.
Tim Loughton: I absolutely agree. At the end of the
day, it is not a computer database, however
elaborate and, in the cast of ContactPoint, very
expensive, that rescues vulnerable children. It is key
professionals, at the sharp end—well trained, well
intentioned, and confident about their job—who
will make the appropriate judgment calls and
intervene. My criticism of what has happened in the
past is this: here is a problem; we all know what the
problem is and agree something urgently needs to be
done, so, “Let’s set up a database”—that becomes
an end in itself. That has done more harm than good.
There was the, “Let’s set up a new database”
approach, and the previous Government came up
with the Integrated Children’s System. I think that
did more harm than any other single IT approach to
child protection, because it meant that social
workers had to spend hours of their time filling in the
equivalent of 50 pages per child, in a very un-user-
friendly system, when a lot more of that time could
have been spent more profitably actually speaking to
the child, as Maggie Atkinson quite rightly would
like, or speaking to the child’s parents, or visiting the
home, etc. The other approach was, “We need to
restructure everything.” Children’s services went
through so many restructurings. So much was
wasted on that; so many new committees have been
set up. Now we have Children’s Trusts. I think the
principle of Children’s Trusts and greater agency
working is right, but Children’s Trusts have become
a huge great body. With Local Safeguarding
Children’s Boards the solution was, “Let’s add more
people.” The previous Government said, “We’re
now going to have two lay people on the Local
Safeguarding Children’s Boards.” We therefore have
a lot of time spent with an increasing cast of
thousands round an increasingly large table, talking
about the problem, when what is needed is one, two
or three key individuals to identify the problem, pick
it up and run with it and knock on the door. Too
much of what has happened is preventing that and
putting so many obstacles in the way: there are so
many boxes to tick, so many processes to go through
before somebody can actually get up and do
something practical.
Q67 Damian Hinds: This might be a point for Dr
Pugh as well: I think a lot of people felt that putting
all 11 million-odd children and youngsters in the
country on a database was slightly disproportionate
to what we are trying to achieve, but on the other
hand you want the right IT systems and support to
make sure that people are well informed and able to
work together and so on. What do you see as the
right balance to be struck, and what should be the
entry criteria for how someone gets on to such a
database?
Tim Loughton: I shall start, and then perhaps
Jeanette can answer. A database is not an end in
itself. We need to identify the problem and then we
need to find solutions, which may be IT based, in
order to address that problem. Too often it has been
the other way round. So the key feature of
everything we do, and the destination of Eileen
Munro, must be to free up that professional’s time to
deal with the case at the sharp end and have the
space to make those well informed judgment calls.
Everything must be predicated on that. What we
want to see as an alternative to ContactPoint, which
we are investigating at the moment, is a system that
concentrates resource on genuinely vulnerable
children. Absolutely a key question, which Maggie
Atkinson raised, is how you define those vulnerable
children. That is the work that we are doing at the
moment. It makes much more sense than thinly
spreading resource across 11.5 million children in
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ContactPoint, which did not do an awful lot of what
people said it would do. It still had serious security
flaws, such that the last Government would not
publish the security review they commissioned into
the security behind it. It had access to 390,000
professionals and goodness knows who else and did
not really tackle the problem. I want a system that
enables us to identify those kids who are genuinely
vulnerable and makes sure that they are on the radar
of those people who are in a position to do
something about it, and to build some other checks
into the system. I had a very interesting conversation
last week in my constituency. I met a group of
doctors. I asked them all what they thought about
ContactPoint. Only one had ever heard of it. These
GPs who are supposed to be part of that system, who
are part of the weak link between child protection
and health, had not even heard of it except for the
one senior doctor who had heard of it because her
daughter goes to an independent school and the
independent schools waged a very aggressive letter-
writing campaign to all their parents saying,
“ContactPoint is terrible. You must do something
about it.” I thought that spoke volumes. I also asked
her, “If you had a child in your surgery with Mum
and there was some suspicious bruising on that child
and you had doubts, what would you do?” Her
reaction was, “I think I’d ring up the school and have
a chat with a responsible teacher there. If that
teacher said, ‘Well, it’s funny you should mention
that because we have been a bit worried about little
Johnny’, that should trigger an intervention. It
would then go to children’s services and a
responsible social worker would be asked to look at
it.” ContactPoint never did that. I want to see some
trigger points in the system so that if a professional
got on to the database to see whether there was any
form about that child and whether that child was
deemed to be vulnerable and was told no, then a few
weeks later another professional got on to that
system about the same child, it triggered someone to
ask why they were getting those inquiries.
ContactPoint would not have done that, so I want a
system that works and brings in interventions when
they are required for those children we know are
genuinely vulnerable. We also need to know about
those children who are just under the radar. We can
spend our resources more effectively on achieving
that sort of solution.
Dr Jeanette Pugh: I simply want to broaden out the
point into what is different about Professor Munro’s
review. It very much starts with what happens in that
living room between that social worker and that
child or that family. What is it in that moment that
prevents that social worker, if that is the case, from
doing the right thing? It could be a whole range of
things to do with an intimidating family or a lack of
confidence. It might be something that another
agency has failed to do or has not done adequately.
What is different, and leads to optimism and a wider
welcome for Professor Munro’s review, is that it
starts from that point, works outwards and looks at
the system, which is not just IT systems and
processes, but the people and how they interact and
whether we can make them interact better to create
a virtuous cycle of behaviour rather than a vicious
circle, which leads to risk aversion and poor
judgment.
Q68 Damian Hinds: On the IT aspect, we all
recognise that the way you outlined it is the way it
must be. But these systems and processes are there as
back-up. The trigger points have to happen. You
need to make sure that the trigger points have been
activated. There are all those sorts of things. Can the
pipework—the infrastructure—of ContactPoint be
recycled into this new purpose, or is it a new spec that
you are having to put out? What progress has been
made thus far?
Tim Loughton: One criticism that we received was
that we did not turn off ContactPoint the day after
the general election. One reason I did not do that
immediately was precisely because I wanted to see
what we could cannibalise from it to be available for
any new systems. Secondly, there are all sorts of
penalty clauses around switching off that contract
early, which I wanted to be able to—I hope that I
have—avoid successfully. There were financial
reasons and some IT development reasons behind
that decision. We are taking all that into account in
the scoping that we are now doing, to see whether we
can have a system that does what we want it to do. It
may be that we cannot make the case for that system.
What I will not say is that we will have a computer
system whether it does what it says on the tin or not,
which, I think, is partly what ContactPoint turned
out to be. If the Munro report comes up with all sorts
of other solutions that are not IT based, we may not
end up with what we have called a national
signposting database of generally vulnerable
children. I have no hard and fast criteria there. It is
a question of what works to make children safer at
the end of the day, and I’ll look at any range of
things. At the end of the day, however, it is the
professionals who rescue vulnerable children, not
technology.
Q69 Charlotte Leslie: Lord Laming’s report was
unequivocal in its view on safeguarding. It stated
that you needed an independent cross-departmental
perspective for improvement. Given that, why has
the National Safeguarding Delivery Unit been
abolished?
Tim Loughton: We opposed the NSDU when it was
set up, because my response was, “Here’s yet another
structure being set up to tick the box ‘We’re doing
something about safeguarding children’.” Roger
Singleton has done a very good job in contributing
to the whole area of child safeguarding, and
continues to do so in other areas and be available to
the Department. The NSDU was created to improve
front-line practice, but its establishment was based
on certain assumptions about how the system should
work. I think that we have moved on from there, and
Eileen Munro’s review will create a completely
different route ahead. Having said that, it is not as
though we have lost that resource, because some of
the people who were working in the NSDU are now
working on the Munro review. What it comes back
to is the culture and approach from the past of,
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“Let’s set up another committee, let’s set up another
unit, let’s set up a database to address the problem”,
rather than getting to grips with the problem at the
sharp end, which is what we are now trying to do.
Q70 Liz Kendall: I have just one quick question, as
people may be wanting to move on to Prime
Minister’s questions. You discussed GPs being a
weak link in the child protection system, so how do
you think the NHS will be better engaged in child
protection when primary care trusts are abolished
and GPs are given responsibility for the NHS?
Tim Loughton: That is a very good question, and it
is certainly an issue that I have been discussing with
colleagues in the Department of Health. With all the
proposed changes to the NHS, the issue of who has
responsibility for safeguarding children absolutely
needs to be factored into those considerations. I
think that that is a fair point, which has not been
reflected in some of the headlines about the changes
in the health service, but goodness knows that it is
my primary focus. There is a problem, which was
identified particularly when the high profile cases
came out, with how A and E departments deal with
child protection—for example, the child who turns
up at 9 o’clock on a Friday night with some
suspicious unexplained injuries. Just over a year ago,
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we did a Freedom of Information survey of all
hospitals on how they would handle that, and they
would handle it in very different ways. In many
cases, they had not even fulfilled the obligations that
came out of the Victoria Climbie´ case from Lord
Laming’s report. That absolutely needs to be
overhauled with what we are doing in the Munro
review. We need to go to Health and say, “This is the
way we need to do it.” That needs to apply to GPs
as well, because GPs were some of the most reluctant
engagers in ContactPoint in the first place, and they
raised all sorts of problems about client
confidentiality and things like that. So they’ve
slightly distanced themselves from the whole
process. The evidence for that, colloquially, was my
meeting last week. They have to be absolutely fully
engaged in the process, because it is GPs and
teachers who probably see those vulnerable children
in the right context. They’re in a position to say,
“Hold on a minute. We need to do so something
about that.” We need to make sure that they are
absolutely integrated into the preventive systems—
or the intervention systems, rather—that we need to
bring into play.
Chair: Minister and Dr Pugh, thank you both very
much for coming along and giving evidence to us this
morning.
